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Abstract
This paper addresses the joint pricing and network selection problem in cognitive radio networks.
The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game where first the Primary and Secondary operators set
the network subscription price to maximize their revenue. Then, users perform the network selection
process, deciding whether to pay more for a guaranteed service, or use a cheaper, best-effort secondary
network, where congestion and low throughput may be experienced.
We derive optimal stable price and network selection settings. More specifically, we use the Nash
equilibrium concept to characterize the equilibria for the price setting game. On the other hand, a Wardrop
equilibrium is reached by users in the network selection game, since in our model a large number of
users must determine individually the network they should connect to. Furthermore, we study network
users’ dynamics using a population game model, and we determine its convergence properties under
replicator dynamics, a simple yet effective selection strategy.
Numerical results demonstrate that our game model captures the main factors behind cognitive
network pricing and network selection, thus representing a promising framework for the design and
understanding of cognitive radio systems.
Index Terms: - Cognitive Radio Networks, Pricing, Network Selection, Stackelberg Game, Population
Game Model, Replicator Dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks (CRNs), also referred to as xG networks, are envisioned to deliver high
bandwidth to mobile users via heterogeneous wireless architectures and dynamic spectrum access tech-
2niques [1], [2]. In CRNs, a Primary (or licensed) User (PU) has a license to operate in a certain spectrum
band; his access is generally controlled by the Primary Operator (PO) and should not be affected by the
operations of any other unlicensed user. On the other hand, the Secondary Operator (SO) has no spectrum
license; therefore, Secondary Users (SUs) must implement additional functionalities to share the licensed
spectrum band without interfering with primary users.
In this work, we consider a cognitive radio scenario which consists of primary and secondary networks,
as well as a large set of cognitive users, and we focus on a fundamental issue concerning such systems,
i.e. whether it is better for a CR user to act as a primary user, paying the Primary operator for costlier,
dedicated network resources with Quality of Service guarantees, or act as a secondary user (paying
the Secondary operator), sharing the spectrum holes left available by licensed users and facing lower
costs with degraded performance guarantees. At the same time, we consider the pricing problem of both
Primary and Secondary operators, who compete with each other, setting access prices to maximize their
revenues.
The joint pricing and cognitive radio network selection problem is modeled as a Stackelberg (leader-
follower) game, where first the Primary and Secondary operators set their access prices in order to
maximize their revenues. In this regard, we study both practical cases where (1) the Primary and Secondary
operators fix access prices at the same time, and (2) the Primary operator exploits his dominant position
by playing first, anticipating the choices of the Secondary operator. Then, network users react to the
prices set by the operators, choosing which network they should connect to, therefore acting either like
primary or secondary users.
The solution provides an insight on how rational users will distribute among existing access solutions
(higher-price primary networks vs. lower-price secondary networks), i.e., the proportion of players who
choose different strategies.
We adopt a fluid queue approximation approach (as in [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]) to study the steady-
state performance of these users, focusing on delay as QoS metric. Besides considering static traffic
equilibrium settings, we further formulate the network selection process of cognitive radio users as a
population game [8], which provides a powerful framework for characterizing the strategic interactions
among large numbers of agents, whose behavior is modeled as a dynamic adjustment process. More
specifically, we study the cognitive users’ behavior according to replicator dynamics [8], [9], since such
users adapt their choices and strategies based on the observed network state.
3We provide equilibrium and convergence properties of the proposed game, and derive optimal stable
price and network selection settings.
More specifically, we use the Nash equilibrium concept to characterize the equilibria of the pricing
game between a finite number of decision makers (viz., the Primary and Secondary operators). In addition
to that, we further determine the Wardrop equilibrium for the network selection game, in which a large
number of users must choose individually the network they should connect to. Such equilibrium is
characterized by two properties, namely traffic equilibrium (the total costs perceived by users on all used
networks are equal) and system optimum principle (the average delay/cost is minimum) [10].
Numerical results obtained in different network scenarios illustrate that our game captures the main
factors behind cognitive network pricing and selection, thus representing a promising framework for the
design and performance evaluation of cognitive radio systems.
In summary, in an effort to understand the pricing and networking selection issues that characterize
CRNs, our work makes the following contributions:
• the proposition of a novel game theoretical model where Primary and Secondary operators set
access prices, and users select which network to connect to, based both on the total delay and the
experienced cost.
• The computation of equilibrium points for our game, as well as relevant performance metrics,
including the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability.
• The analysis of a dynamic model, based on population games, which further illustrates how players
converge to the equilibrium in a dynamic context under an easily implementable, distributed strategy
(viz., replicator dynamics), along with formal, detailed proofs of its convergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: related work is reviewed in Section II. The network model
for the proposed joint pricing and network selection game is described in Section III; the equilibrium
points of such game, as well as its Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability, are derived in Sections IV
and V, respectively. The dynamic network selection model, based on population games and replicator
dynamics, is presented in Section VI, and its convergence properties are demonstrated in Section VII.
Numerical results are discussed in Section VIII, while Section IX concludes this work.
4II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first review the most notable works on spectrum pricing and access in cognitive
radio networks [3], [4], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. Then, we discuss relevant works
that use evolutionary games to study the users behavior in CR as well as in heterogeneous wireless
networks [19], [20], [21], [22], [23].
In [11], the authors provide a systematic overview on CR networking and communications, by looking
at the key functions of the physical, MAC and network layers involved in a CR design, and by studying
how these layers are crossly related. In [3], the authors consider the decision-making process of SUs
who have the choice of either acquiring a dedicated spectrum (paying a price) or using the primary
user band for free, and they characterize the resulting Nash equilibrium for the single-band case. This
work differs from ours in two main aspects: 1) the CR users already arrive at the system as secondary
or primary ones; SUs have the choice between dedicated or PU band, and 2) the users’ behavior is
studied based on queueing theory. The work in [4] considers a CRN where multiple secondary users
(SUs) contend for spectrum usage, using random access, over available primary user channels, focusing
on SUs’ queueing delay performance. A fluid queue approximation approach is adopted to study the
steady-state delay performance of SUs. In [12], the authors analyze the price competition between PUs
who can lease out their unused bandwidth to secondaries in exchange for a fee, considering bandwidth
uncertainty and spatial reuse. The problem of dynamic spectrum leasing in a secondary market of CRNs
is considered in [14], where secondary service providers lease spectrum from spectrum brokers to provide
service to SUs.
Recent works have considered evolutionary games to study the users’ behavior in cognitive radio and
heterogeneous wireless networks [19], [20], [21], [22], [23].
In [19], the authors use evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of user behavior in
heterogeneous wireless access networks (i.e., WMANs, cellular networks, and WLANs). The evolutionary
game solution is compared to the Nash equilibrium, and a set of algorithms (i.e., population evolution and
reinforcement learning algorithms) are proposed to implement the evolutionary network selection game
model. In [20], the dynamics of a multiple-seller, multiple-buyer spectrum trading market is modeled as
an evolutionary game, in which PUs want to sell and SUs want to buy spectrum opportunities. Secondary
users evolve over time, buying the spectrum opportunities that optimize their performance in terms of
transmission rate and price. In [21], the authors propose a distributed framework for spectrum access, with
5and without complete network information (i.e., channel statistics and user selections). In the first case, an
evolutionary game approach is proposed, in which each SU compares its payoff with the system average
payoff to evolve its spectrum access decision over time. For the incomplete information case, a learning
mechanism is proposed, in which each SU estimates its expected throughput locally and learns to adjust its
channel selection strategy adaptively. The problem of opportunistic spectrum access in CSMA/CA-based
cognitive radio networks is also addressed in [22] from an evolutionary game theoretic angle.
In our preliminary works [24], [25], we addressed the pricing and network selection problems in
cognitive radio networks. However, in [24], we assumed that the PO and SO use separate frequency
bands, which greatly simplifies the problem, and we did not study the impact of the order in which
operators set prices on the quality of the reached equilibria. The work in [25] differs from the one
presented here in that it considered uniquely Primary operators, and a finite set of SUs, which are
characterized by elastic traffic demands that can be transmitted over one or multiple frequency spectra.
Unlike previous works, which study the interaction between two well-defined sets of users (primary and
secondary ones) who already performed the choice of using the primary or the secondary network, our
paper tackles a fundamental issue in CRNs. In fact, we model the users’ decision process that occurs before
such users enter the CRN, thus assessing the economic interest of deploying secondary (xG) networks.
Such choice depends on the trade-off between cost and performance guarantees in such networks. At the
same time, we derive the optimal price setting for both Primary and Secondary operators that play before
network users, in order to maximize their revenue. We use enhanced game theoretical tools, derived from
population game theory, to model the network selection dynamics, providing convergence conditions and
equilibrium settings.
III. NETWORK MODEL
We now detail the network model, which is illustrated in Figure 1: a cognitive radio wireless system
which consists of a secondary (xG) network that coexists with a primary network at the same location
and on the same spectrum band.
We consider an overlay model (focusing on the “interference avoidance” approach [26], [27] to cognitive
radio) as in [3], [20], [28], where Secondary Users periodically sense the radio spectrum, intelligently
detect occupancy in the different frequency bands and then opportunistically communicate over the
spectrum holes left available by Primary Users, thus avoiding interference with active primary users. In
6Fig. 1. CRN scenario with a primary network and a secondary (xG) network. Arriving users must decide whether to join the
primary network, paying a subscription fee (p1) for guaranteed QoS, or the xG network (which has a lower subscription cost,
p2 < p1, and less performance guarantees), based on the expected cost and congestion levels.
other words, our model is an overlay CR where secondary users opportunistically access primary users’
spectrum only when it is not occupied. As in [3], we further consider perfect primary user detection at
the secondary users and zero interference tolerance at each of the primary and secondary users.
We assume that users arrive at this system following a Poisson process with rate λ, and the maximum
achievable transmission rate of the wireless channel (licensed to the PO and opportunistically used by
the SO) is denoted by C . The total traffic λ admitted in the network must not exceed its capacity C;
this can be obtained, for example, using admission control techniques, which are out of the scope of this
paper. All these assumptions are commonly adopted in several recent works like [4], [5], [6], [7].
Each arriving user must choose whether to join the primary network (paying a higher subscription
cost) or the xG one (which has a lower subscription cost), based on criteria to be specified below, i.e.,
a combination of cost and QoS (service time/latency).
Finally, let us denote by λP the overall transmission rate of primary users (i.e., those who choose the
primary network) and by λS the rate of secondary users, so that λ = λP + λS . Table I summarizes the
basic notation used in our game model.
We now define users’ cost functions as well as the utility functions of Primary and Secondary operators.
We assume that the total cost incurred by a network user is a combination of the service time (delay, or
latency) experienced in the network, and the cost for the player to access such network.
We underline that a similar model is used in [3], where the average cost incurred by a Secondary User
(SU) consists of two components: (1) the price (C˜) of the dedicated spectrum band, and (2) an average
delay cost ( 1µ ), where µ is the service time. The average delay cost is weighted by a parameter α, which
represents the delay vs. monetary cost tradeoff of the SUs. To further support our choice, another similar
7TABLE I
BASIC NOTATION
λ Total traffic accepted in the network
C Wireless channel capacity (Maximum achievable transmission rate of the wireless channel)
α Weighting parameter of delay with respect to access cost
λP Total traffic transmitted by Primary Users
λS Total traffic transmitted by Secondary Users
XP Fraction of Primary Users
XS Fraction of Secondary Users
p1, p2 Price charged by the PO and the SO, respectively, to access its services
K Constant, velocity of convergence
model is considered by Anshelevich et al. in [29] for a different networking context. The authors set the
player’s cost for using an edge e in the network as a combination of a cost function ce(x) and a latency
function de(x); the goal of each user in such game is to minimize the sum of his cost and latency. The
same model is also used in [30]. Finally, note that in [19] the authors consider two components, namely
throughput (the allocated capacity to a player, which is obviously related to the delay experienced by
such user) and the corresponding price (see equations (2) and (3) in [19]).
In this work, we consider a fluid queue approximation approach, which permits to study the steady-state
delay performance of both PUs and SUs. To this aim, and without loss of generality, we assume that the
wireless channel is modeled as a M|M|1 queue, with service rate C and arrival rate λ. Recall that both
the primary and secondary networks operate on the same channel; the Primary and Secondary operators
fix the prices p1 and p2, respectively, for accessing their services. Therefore, the total cost perceived by
primary users is given by:
CostPU =
α
C − λP + p1, (1)
where parameter α weights the relative importance of the experienced delay with respect to the access
cost. Note that primary users are affected exclusively by the traffic transmitted by primary users (λP ),
and not by the traffic of secondary users (λS), since usually, in a cognitive radio network, primary users
have strict priority over secondary users; these latter must therefore implement spectrum sensing and
spectrum handover strategies to avoid any interference towards primary users, and can transmit only in
the spectrum holes left unoccupied by these ones.
As mentioned previously, we consider perfect primary user detection at the secondary users and zero
8interference tolerance at each of the primary and secondary users.
For this reason, secondary users’ performance is affected by the whole traffic, transmitted by both
primary and secondary users; such users are characterized by the following cost function:
CostSU =
α
C − (λP + λS) + p2 =
α
C − λ + p2. (2)
As for operators’ utilities, they correspond to the total revenue obtained by pricing users. As a
consequence, the Primary operator’s utility function is expressed as follows:
UP = p1λP . (3)
Correspondingly, the Secondary operator’s utility function is:
US = p2λS = p2(λ− λP ). (4)
To summarize, network users minimize the perceived cost, which is expressed as CostPU = αC−λP +p1
(see equation (1)) if they choose the primary network, and CostSU = αC−λ + p2 (see equation (2)) if
they act as secondary users. As for Primary/Secondary operators, they try to maximize the total revenue
obtained by pricing primary (UP = p1λP ) or secondary users (US = p2λS), respectively. Users’ cost
functions as well as operators’ utilities are also reported in Tables II and III, respectively.
TABLE II
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY USER’S COST FUNCTIONS
Primary User (PU) CostPU = αC−λP + p1
Secondary User (SU) CostSU = αC−λ + p2
TABLE III
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OPERATOR’S UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Primary Operator (PO) UP = p1λP
Secondary Operator (SO) US = p2λS
IV. EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
In this section, we derive the equilibrium points of our game, namely: (i) the equilibrium traffic sent
by primary and secondary users, (ii) steady-state Primary/Secondary operator’s utilities, as well as (iii)
equilibrium prices set by the PO/SO.
9We consider two practical cases: (1) both operators fix their access price at the same time, trying
to maximize their own revenue (Section IV-A), and (2) the PO plays before the SO, anticipating the
strategy of this latter, thus exploiting his dominant position (Section IV-B). We will refer to the first case
as the TOGETHER scenario, while the latter will be referred to as the BEFORE scenario. Note that when
the Primary and Secondary operators play at the same time, we have a Cournot duopoly competition
between such operators. However, in the original Cournot duopoly, production quantities (outputs) and
prices are linear, while in this work we consider a nonlinear system which requires non-standard studies
that cannot rely on existing results. On the other hand, when the Primary operator plays before the
Secondary, anticipating his choices, we have a Stackelberg game model between the operators.
The Nash equilibrium concept will be used for the price setting game, since we have a finite number of
decision makers, i.e., the two network operators. More precisely, a Nash Equilibrium is a set of players’
(here, operators’) strategies, each of which maximizes the player’s revenue, and such that none of the
actors has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. For this reason the corresponding network configurations
are said to be stable.
On the other hand, a Wardrop equilibrium [31] is reached by CR users in the network selection game,
since in our model a large number of users must determine individually the network they should connect
to. Such equilibrium satisfies the two Wardrop’s principles, namely traffic equilibrium (the total costs
perceived by users on all used networks are equal) and system optimum principle (the average delay/cost
is minimum).
Therefore, at Wardrop equilibrium, primary and secondary users will both experience the same cost,
that is, CostPU = CostSU , or:
α
C − λP + p1 =
α
C − (λP + λS) + p2 =
α
C − λ + p2. (5)
This permits to compute the equilibrium traffic1 for the primary network as a function of the prices
set by both the PO and SO:
λP =
αλ− C(C − λ)(p1 − p2)
α− (C − λ)(p1 − p2) , (6)
with 0 ≤ λP ≤ λ. The traffic sent by secondary users, λS , will therefore be equal to λ− λP . Note that,
1With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote equilibrium flows still by λP and λS , since in the following we will almost
exclusively refer to equilibrium game conditions.
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in order for the equilibrium condition (5) to hold and for equilibrium traffic λP to be comprised in the
[0, λ] range, p1 − p2 must satisfy the condition p1 − p2 < αλC(C−λ) . Furthermore, since there is a unique
λP value which satisfies condition (5), such value represents the unique Wardrop equilibrium point of
the network selection game.
The corresponding equilibrium utility for the PO is given by the following expression:
UP = p1λP = p1 · αλ− C(C − λ)(p1 − p2)
α− (C − λ)(p1 − p2) , (7)
while the utility of the SO will be:
US = p2λS = p2(λ− λP ) = p2λ+ p2
[ α(C − λ)
α− (C − λ)(p1 − p2) − C
]
. (8)
Hereafter we compute equilibrium prices for both our considered scenarios.
A. The Primary and Secondary operators fix their prices simultaneously (TOGETHER scenario)
In this scenario, both the Primary and Secondary operators fix their prices simultaneously, trying to
maximize their own revenue. As a consequence, to maximize the utility function of the PO, it suffices
to take the derivative of UP with respect to p1, imposing its equality to zero:
∂UP
∂p1
= C − α(C − λ)[α − (C − λ)(p1 − p2)] + α(C − λ)
2p1
[α− (C − λ)(p1 − p2)]2 = 0, (9)
Hence, we can express the price p1 as a function of p2:
p1 = p2 +
α
C − λ
{
1−
√
(C − λ)
αC
[α+ (C − λ)p2]
}
. (10)
Similarly, the Secondary operator aims at maximizing his revenue US ; by deriving US with respect
to p2 and imposing its equality to zero, we obtain:
∂US
∂p2
= (λ− C) + α
2(C − λ)− α(C − λ)2p1
[α− (C − λ)(p1 − p2)]2 = 0, (11)
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and the expression of p2 as a function of p1 is given by:
p2 = p1 − 1
(C − λ){α −
√
α2 − α(C − λ)p1}. (12)
Finally, combining expressions (10) and (12) we obtain the equilibrium price values p1 and p2, which
are function of α, C and λ:
p1 = α
(3C2 − λ2)− (C − λ)2
√
9C−5λ
C−λ
2(2C − λ)2(C − λ) (13)
p2 = α
C
√
9C − 5λ− (3C − 2λ)√C − λ
2(2C − λ)2√C − λ , (14)
with p1 ≥ 0 and p2 ≥ 0.
B. The Primary operator plays before the Secondary (BEFORE scenario)
In this case, we have a Stackelberg game between operators, in which the Primary operator is the
leader while the Secondary operator is the follower.
The PO will therefore anticipate the choice of the SO (who will set the price p2 in order to maximize
his utility), and will play his best strategy, setting the optimal value for p1 taking into account the choice
on p2 operated by the SO.
To derive the equilibrium prices in such scenario, it suffices to take the derivative of US with respect
to the price p2, obtaining p2 in function of p1 (see equation (12)). We next insert the expression of p2
in (7), obtaining UP as a function of p1:
UP = p1
{
C +
α(λ− C)√
α2 − α(C − λ)p1
}
.
Deriving UP with respect to the price p1, we obtain C+
√
α(λ−c)[2α−(C−λ)p1]
2[α−(C−λ)p1]3/2 ; then, imposing that such
derivative is null, we obtain the equilibrium value for p1, which has the following expression:
p1 =
α
C − λ
{
1− (Z + h
3
)2
}
, (15)
where Z = (h4 )
1/3
[(√
1 + 427h
2 + 1
)2/3
+
(√
1 + 427h
2 − 1
)2/3]
, and h = C−λ2C .
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If we combine such expression of p1 with (12), we obtain the equilibrium price set by the Secondary
operator:
p2 =
α
C − λ(Z +
h
3
)[1 − (Z + h
3
)]. (16)
C. Comments
Note that, in both the TOGETHER and BEFORE scenarios, equilibrium prices are unique. In fact, if
we compute the second derivatives in both network scenarios (∂2UP∂p12 and ∂
2US
∂p22
), they are both negative
for all price values in the feasible region p1 − p2 < αλC(C−λ) . Hence, the maximums, as well as the Nash
equilibrium points, are unique.
Furthermore, equilibrium prices (p1 and p2) are directly proportional to α, while equilibrium flows
(λP and λS) are independent of α; this can be seen by substituting, in expression (6), p1 − p2, which is
proportional to α. As a consequence, operators’ utilities grow proportionally to α. All these trends will
be illustrated in more detail in the Numerical Results section.
Finally, primary users’ equilibrium traffic, λP , decreases with increasing C values, while secondary
users’ traffic follows an opposite trend. As for operators’ prices and utilities, they both decrease with C ,
as we will quantify in Section VIII.
V. PRICE OF ANARCHY AND PRICE OF STABILITY
We now investigate the efficiency of the equilibria reached by operators and users in our joint pricing
and network selection game, through the determination of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price
of Stability (PoS). They both quantify the loss of efficiency as the ratio between the cost of a specific
stable outcome/equilibrium and the cost of the optimal outcome, which could be designed by a central
authority. In particular the PoA, first introduced in [32], considers the worst stable outcome (that with
the highest cost), while the PoS [29] considers the best stable equilibrium (that with the lowest cost).
However, we observe that in our game these two performance metrics coincide due to the uniqueness of
the equilibrium reached by network users. For this reason, in the following we will refer exclusively to
the first performance figure, the PoA, which has a particular importance in characterizing the efficiency
of distributed game formulations.
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To determine the optimal system-wide solution, we define the social welfare S as the weighted average
of the delays experienced by primary and secondary users; S is therefore a function of the amount x of
traffic sent by primary users:
S(x) =
αx
C − x +
α(λ− x)
C − λ .
Note that p1 and p2 do not appear in the social welfare’s expression, since all the prices paid by
primary/secondary users (which represent for them a disutility or cost) correspond to a symmetric utility
or gain for the Primary/Secondary operators, who collect this income in exchange for the network services
they offer.
To minimize this quantity, it suffices to derive with respect to x and impose its equality to zero, thus
obtaining:
dS(x)
dx
=
αC
(C − x)2 −
α
C − λ = 0,
which leads to xmin = C −
√
C(C − λ).
The optimal social welfare is therefore equal to:
S(xmin) = α
[C −√C(C − λ)√
C(C − λ) +
λ− C +
√
C(C − λ)
C − λ
]
= 2α
[√ C
C − λ − 1
]
. (17)
Recall that the total traffic transmitted by primary users at the Wardrop equilibrium is given by
expression (6), and the equilibrium traffic for secondary users is λs = λ− λp.
The (average) total delay experienced by primary/secondary users at equilibrium is therefore equal to:
TDE = α
λp
C − λp + α
λs
C − λ, (18)
while the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst (here, the unique)
equilibrium and the social optimum, PoA = TDES(xmin) .
Hereafter, we derive the closed-form expressions for the PoA in both the considered scenarios (i.e.,
the TOGETHER and BEFORE scenarios). To this aim, it is sufficient to use equilibrium expressions for
λP and λS in both scenarios.
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A. PoA for the TOGETHER scenario (the PO and SO play together)
The total delay of cognitive users at equilibrium (TDTE) can be expressed as follows:
TDTE = α
λp
C − λp + α
λs
C − λ =
αλ
C − λ − (p1 − p2)λp
=
αC(9C − 5λ)− α(3C − 2λ)
√
(C − λ)(9C − 5λ)
(2C − λ)[(C − λ) +
√
(C − λ)(9C − 5λ)] . (19)
Therefore, the Price of Anarchy can be calculated as:
PoAT =
TDTE
S(xmin)
=
C(9C − 5λ)√C − λ− (3C − 2λ)(C − λ)√9C − 5λ
2(2C − λ)[(C − λ) +
√
(C − λ)(9C − 5λ)][√C −√C − λ] . (20)
B. PoA for the BEFORE scenario (the PO plays before the SO)
In this case, the total delay of cognitive users at equilibrium (TDBE ) can be expressed as:
TDBE = α
λp
C − λp + α
λs
C − λ =
αλ
C − λ − (p1 − p2)λp
= α
[
− 2 + C
C − λ(Z +
h
3
) +
1
Z + h3
]
, (21)
where
Z = (
h
4
)1/3
[(√
1 +
4
27
h2 + 1
)2/3
+
(√
1 +
4
27
h2 − 1
)2/3]
,
and h = C−λ2C .
The Price of Anarchy is therefore equal to:
PoAB =
TDBE
S(xmin)
=
√
C − λ
2(
√
C − λ−√C)
[
− 2 + C
C − λ(Z +
h
3
) +
1
Z + h3
]
. (22)
Note that both expressions (20) and (22) are independent of α.
VI. COGNITIVE USERS’ BEHAVIOR: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
After having characterized the static, steady-state equilibria reached by network operators and users in
the joint pricing and spectrum selection game, in this section we further focus on modeling the dynamic
behavior of network users.
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To this aim, we use population dynamics (and, in particular, replicator dynamics) to model the behavior
of users who decide which network they should connect to, since such dynamics models network users
who adapt their choices and strategies based on the observed state of the system (in terms of costs and
congestion, in our case).
Before introducing replicator dynamics for our network selection game, we must first define some
relevant game theoretic concepts.
A. Introduction to Population Games and Replicator Dynamics
Hereafter we briefly introduce population games and replicator dynamics; for more details, the reader
is referred to the book by W. H. Sandholm [8].
1) Population Games: A population game G, with Q non-atomic classes of players (i.e., network
users) is defined by a mass and a strategy set for each class, and a payoff function for each strategy. By
a non-atomic population, we mean that the contribution of each member of the population is very small;
this is the case in our game, where a large set of users compete for CRN’s bandwidth resources. We
denote the set of classes by Q = {1, . . . , Q}, where Q ≥ 1. The class q has mass mq. Let Sq be the set
of strategies available for players of class q, where Sq = {1, . . . , sq}. These strategies can be thought of
as the actions that members of q could possibly take (i.e., connecting to the primary or the secondary
network).
During the game play, each player of class q selects a strategy from Sq. The mass of players of class q
that choose the strategy n ∈ Sq is denoted by xqn, where
∑
n∈Sq x
q
n = mq. We denote the vector of strategy
distributions being used by the entire population by x = {x1, . . . , xQ}, where xi = {xi1, . . . , xisi}. The
vector x can be thought of as the state of the system.
The marginal payoff function (per mass unit) of players of class q who play strategy n when the state
of the system is x is denoted by F qn(x), usually referred to as fitness in evolutionary game theory, which
is assumed to be continuous and differentiable. The total payoff of the players of class q is therefore
∑
n∈Sq F
q
n(x)x
q
n.
2) Replicator Dynamics: The replicator dynamics describes the behavior of a large population of agents
who are randomly matched to play normal form games. It was first introduced in biology by Taylor and
Jonker [33] to model the evolution of species, and it is also used in the economics field. Recently, such
dynamics has been applied to many networking problems, like routing and resource allocation [34], [35].
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Given xqn, which represents the proportion of players of class q that choose strategy n, as illustrated
before, the replicator dynamics can be expressed as follows:
x˙qn = x
q
n
[
F qn(x)−
1
mq
∑
n∈Sq
F qn(x)x
q
n
]
, (23)
where x˙qn represents the derivative of xqn with respect to time.
In fact, the ratio x˙qn/xqn measures the evolutionary success (the rate of increase) of a strategy n. This
ratio can be also expressed as the difference in fitness F qn(x) of the strategy n and the average fitness
1
mq
∑
n∈Sq F
q
n(x)x
q
n of the class q.
An important concept in population games and replicator dynamics is Wardrop equilibrium [31], which
we introduced in Section IV. In this context, a state xˆ is a Wardrop equilibrium if for any class q ∈ Q,
all strategies being used by the members of q yield the same marginal payoff to each member of q,
whereas the marginal payoff that would be obtained by members of q is lower for all strategies not used
by class q.
B. Cognitive Users’ Behavior in the Network Selection Game: Replicator Dynamics
Having reviewed the mathematical tools we will rely on, we now focus on the cognitive radio scenario
illustrated in Section III, introducing replicator dynamics for the network selection game. In particular,
we consider a population game G with a non-atomic set of players (q = 1), which is defined by a strategy
set denoted by S = {sp, ss}, identical for all players, and a payoff function for each strategy; sp means
that the player chooses the primary network, and ss that the player chooses the secondary network, using
the spectrum holes left free by primary users.
Our goal is to determine the dynamic network selection settings (XP and XS = 1 − XP ), i.e., the
fraction of players that choose the primary and secondary network, respectively, based on the equilibrium
prices set by Primary and Secondary operators. Hence, the total traffic accepted in the primary network
is equal to λP = λXP , and the one accepted in the secondary network is λS = λXS .
The proposed replicator dynamics provides a means to analyze how players can “learn” about their
environment, and converge towards an equilibrium choice. Replicator dynamics is also useful to investigate
the speed of convergence of strategy adaptation to reach a stable solution in the game. A mathematical
analysis to bound such speed is provided in Section VII. In this case, CR users need to know some
information, viz. the total cost (the service delay plus the price charged by the PO/SO, respectively) and
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the size of the populations (XP , XS) that already performed such selection, before undertaking the best
choice based on the system state.
As illustrated in Section III, the goal of each cognitive radio user is to minimize a weighted sum of
his delay (latency) and price paid to the network operator (either primary or secondary), α being the
parameter which permits to give more weight to delay with respect to the paid price. Hence, we can
formalize the network selection game as follows:
X˙P = KXP
[ −α
C − λXP − p1 −
( −αXP
C − λXP −XP · p1 − (1−XP )(
α
C − λ + p2)
)]
=
= KXP (1−XP )
[
− p1 + p2 + α
C − λ −
α
C − λXP
]
, (24)
where X˙P represents the derivative of XP with respect to time.
This equation has the same structure as the replicator dynamics (see equation (23)): the first term
(F qn(x) ≡ −αC−λXP − p1) corresponds to the total cost (the service delay plus the price charged by the
PO) perceived by users that choose to connect to the primary network, using a M|M|1 approximation;
the second term ( 1mq
∑
n∈Sq F
q
n(x)x
q
n ≡ −αXPC−λXP −XP ·p1− (1−XP )( αC−λ +p2)) represents the average
cost/delay incurred by the fraction XP of primary users as well as by the fraction XS of secondary users
(recall that p1 and p2 are the prices charged by the Primary and Secondary operator, respectively).
In particular, the speed of variation of XP is proportional to the population size XP (via the propor-
tionality coefficient K), which models the willingness of the population to change strategy.
A similar equation can be written for Secondary Users, thus we can express the replicator dynamics
for such SUs as follows:
X˙S = KXS
[ −α
C − λ − p2 −
( −α(1−XS)
C − λ(1−XS) − (1−XS) · p1 −XS(
α
C − λ + p2)
)]
=
= KXS(1−XS)
[
p1 − p2 − α
C − λ +
α
(C − λ) + λXS
]
. (25)
Obviously, by comparing these two expressions it can be verified that condition Xp +Xs = 1 holds.
It can be demonstrated [8] that Wardrop equilibria are the stationary points of equations (24) and (25).
As we will show in the next section, it can be easily proved that the unique non-trivial fixed point of
such dynamics coincides with the Wardrop equilibrium point of the CR users’ network selection game
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already determined in Section IV.
VII. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
This section provides an in-depth analysis on the replicator dynamics given by (24)2. To this end, we
rewrite it in a discretized version as follows:
XP (t+ 1) = XP (t) + kXP (t)[1 −XP (t)]
[
A− 1
B −XP (t)
]
, (26)
where k = Kα/λ, A = λ(−p1/α+ p2/α+ 1C−λ) and B = C/λ.
The above dynamics has three fixed points, among which 0 and 1 are trivial fixed points corresponding
to the case where all users either act as secondary or primary users, respectively. X∗P = B − 1/A is the
only non-trivial fixed point, which is also the Wardrop equilibrium of the game; its expression is equal
to X∗P =
λP
λ , where λP is the equilibrium flow already derived for the static game in Section IV (see
expression (6)).
In the subsequent analysis, we investigate the convergence of the replicator dynamics to X∗P . We start
by establishing the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 1. Under the condition that K(A− 1B−1) ≤ 1, it holds that
• XP (t+ 1) is non-decreasing w.r.t. XP (t) for XP (t) ∈ [0,X∗P ) and non-increasing w.r.t. XP (t) for
XP (t) ∈ (X∗P , 1];
• XP (t+ 1) > XP (t), ∀XP (t) < X∗P and XP (t+ 1) < XP (t), ∀XP (t) > X∗P .
Proof: The proof of the first part is straightforward by checking the derivative ∂XP (t+1)/∂XP (t).
Specifically, it can be checked that under the condition that K(A− 1B−1 ) ≤ 1, ∂XP (t+1)/∂XP (t) > 0
when XP (t) ∈ [0,X∗P ) and ∂XP (t + 1)/∂XP (t) < 0 when XP (t) ∈ (X∗P , 1]. The second part follows
readily from (26).
The following theorem establishes the convergence of the replicator dynamics to the non-trivial fixed
point X∗P .
Theorem 1. Under the condition that K(A − 1B−1) ≤ 1, the replicator dynamics depicted in (26)
converges to the non-trivial fixed point X∗P for any initial state 0 < XP (0) < 1.
2Note that the same analysis can be conducted for (25).
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Proof: Consider an arbitrary sequence of update steps commencing from an initial vector XP (0).
We distinguish the following two cases:
• Case 1: 0 < XP (0) ≤ X∗P . In this case (recall that X∗P is a fixed point of (26)), it follows from
Lemma 1 that: (1) XP (t) ≤ X∗P ,∀t and (2) XP (0) ≤ XP (1) ≤ · · · ≤ XP (t − 1) ≤ XP (t) ≤ · · · ,
i.e., XP (t) is a non-decreasing sequence. Since XP (t) is also bounded by X∗P , it follows that it
must converge to a limit. Since there is no fixed point other than X∗P in the range (0,X∗P ], this limit
must be X∗P .
• Case 2: X∗P < XP (0) < 1. This case can be proved in a similar manner. In fact (recall that X∗P is a
fixed point of (26)), it follows from Lemma 1 that: (1) XP (t) > X∗P ,∀t and (2) XP (0) ≥ XP (1) ≥
· · · ≥ XP (t − 1) ≥ XP (t) ≥ · · · , i.e., XP (t) is a non-increasing sequence. Since XP (t) is also
bounded by X∗P , it follows that it must converge to a limit. Since there is no fixed point other than
X∗P in the range [X∗P , 1), this limit must be X∗P .
Combining the above analysis, the replicator dynamics is ensured to converge to the non-trivial fixed
point X∗P for any initial state 0 < XP (0) < 1.
The above theorem essentially illustrates that with a conservative strategy (i.e., small K), the replicator
dynamics is ensured to converge to the Wardrop equilibrium.
Remark. The above theorem establishes the sufficient condition for the convergence of the replicator
dynamics to the unique non-trivial fixed point, which is also the Wardrop equilibrium. It follows straight-
forwardly that under the same condition, the equilibrium is also stable in that any deviated point from it
will be dragged back under the replicator dynamics. In fact, X∗P is an evolutionary stable equilibrium.
Meantime, it follows from the theorem that the two trivial fixed points 0 and 1 are not stable, in the
sense that any deviation from them will drag the system to X∗P .
It is also worth pointing out that Theorem 1 provides only a sufficient condition for the convergence
and may be too stringent in some cases.
We further investigate the stability and the convergence speed of the replicator dynamics in the following
theorem, following the guidelines of [36].
Theorem 2. Under the condition that K(A− 1B−1 ) < 1, the non-trivial fixed point X∗P is exponentially
stable under the replicator dynamics depicted in (26), i.e., there exists 0 ≤ k′ < 1 such that |X(t)−X∗P | ≤
(k′)t|X(0) −X∗P |.
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Proof: We show that the replicator dynamics XP (t)→ XP (t+ 1) in (26) is a contraction.
The contraction is defined as follows: let (X, d) be a metric space, f : X → X is a contraction if there
exists a constant k′ ∈ [0, 1) such that ∀x, y ∈ X, d(f(x), f(y)) ≤ k′d(x, y), where d(x, y) = ||x− y|| =
maxi ||xi − yi||.
To that end, note that:
d(f(x), f(y)) = ||f(x)− f(y)|| ≤
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∂f∂x
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ · ||x− y|| =
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∂f∂x
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ d(x, y).
If the Jacobian
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∂f∂x
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k′, then f is a contraction.
By some algebraic operations, we can bound the Jacobian as
||J ||∞ = max
XP (t)∈(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∂XP (t+ 1)∂XP (t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1−K(A− 1B − 1).
Hence, since the condition K(A− 1B−1 ) < 1 holds, i.e., ||J ||∞ ≤ k′ , 1−K(A− 1B−1 ) < 1, X∗P is
exponentially stable where k′ is the exponential convergence speed.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we analyze and discuss the numerical results obtained from solving our joint pricing
and spectrum access game model in different cognitive radio scenarios. More in detail, we measure the
sensitivity of the operators’ utilities and prices, as well as users’ equilibrium flows and costs, to different
parameters like the total traffic λ accepted in the network and the channel capacity C .
Before doing so, let us first consider an example of a primary operator utility function (UP ). Figure 2
shows this latter as a function of the price p1 set by the Primary Operator (the price p2 has been fixed to
the Nash equilibrium value), with α = 1, C = 100 and λ = 10. By simply deriving and using the second
order derivative test, it can be proved that the PO’s revenue has a global maximum, as illustrated in the
figure, since for small p1 values the incoming primary traffic is priced too low, resulting in a low PO
revenue, while for high p1 values few users choose the primary network, thus diminishing its profitability.
A. Effect of the traffic accepted in the network (λ)
We first consider a CRN scenario with maximum channel capacity C = 100 and total accepted traffic λ
varying in the [0, 100] range. The parameter α, which expresses the relative importance of the experienced
delay with respect to the access cost, is set to 1, unless otherwise stated.
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Fig. 2. Primary Operator’s utility (UP ) as a function of the imposed price p1 in the TOGETHER scenario. Price p2 has been
fixed to the Nash equilibrium value.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the prices set at the Nash equilibrium by the Primary (p1) and the Secondary
operator (p2), respectively, in the two considered scenarios (the PO and SO play TOGETHER, the PO
plays BEFORE the SO, anticipating the choices of this latter). The difference between the prices set by
the operators in these two scenarios can be better appreciated in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) for the PO and
SO, respectively. All numerical results illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 are summarized in Table IV.
It can be observed (Figure 4(a)) that in the BEFORE scenario, the PO sets a higher price than in the
TOGETHER scenario, until the network is overloaded (λ ≤ 80); above this threshold, the price set by
the PO in the former scenario is lower than in the latter. As for the price set by the Secondary operator
(Figure 4(b)), it is always higher in the BEFORE than in the TOGETHER scenario, and such difference
increases consistently for increasing λ values. This is the reason why the PO in the BEFORE scenario
can lower his price while still attracting the large majority of network users, as we will show in the
following.
TABLE IV
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES p1 AND p2 SET BY THE PO/SO (AS WELL AS THEIR DIFFERENCE), FOR DIFFERENT
VALUES OF THE TOTAL TRAFFIC λ OFFERED TO THE NETWORK FOR BOTH THE BEFORE AND TOGETHER
SCENARIOS.
λ p1TOGETHER × 10
−3 p1BEFORE × 10
−3 p2TOGETHER × 10
−3 p2BEFORE × 10
−3
∆p1 × 10
−3
∆p2 × 10
−3
20 1.806 2.441 0.868 1.154 0.635 0.286
40 5.242 6.375 2.374 2.805 1.133 0.431
60 12.885 14.122 5.288 5.613 1.237 0.325
80 37.5 37.5 12.5 12.5 0 0
90 87.724 85.112 22.761 23.697 - 2.612 0.936
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Fig. 3. (a) Equilibrium price p1 set by the Primary operator and (b) Equilibrium price p2 set by the Secondary operator, as a
function of the total traffic λ offered to the network for both the BEFORE and TOGETHER scenarios.
The corresponding equilibrium traffic sent by primary (λP ) and secondary users (λS) is illustrated in
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) as a function of λ, for both the considered scenarios.
We can observe that:
• The traffic accepted (and consequently, the overall fraction of users) in the primary network, λP ,
always increases with the offered traffic, until finally, when λ → C , all users choose the primary
network. This is due to the superior attractiveness of such network (in terms of the delay experienced
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Fig. 4. (a) Difference in the equilibrium prices p1 set by the Primary operator in the TOGETHER and BEFORE scenarios,
and (b) difference in the equilibrium prices p2 set by the Secondary operator in the same scenarios.
by users) with respect to the secondary one, since resources are licensed to primary users and SUs
always observe a higher delay than PUs.
• Furthermore, concerning λP , in the BEFORE scenario the PO admits (slightly) less traffic than the
SO, when λ < 80% of the total capacity C (Figure 5(a)); this is due to the fact that the equilibrium
price p1 set by the PO in such scenario is higher than in the TOGETHER case (see Figure 4(a)),
which in turn makes λP decrease. In the high traffic regime, the PO increasingly attracts more traffic
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due to the significantly lower delay experienced in the primary network, while the SO increases p2
in an effort to increase his utility in spite of the customer rush towards the primary network (more
specifically, fewer clients choose the SO, who reacts by raising his access price p2 in order to
increase his revenue, reaction which in turn accentuates this phenomenon).
• Concerning λS , its derivative with respect to λ is always decreasing: it is increasingly less attractive
to be a secondary user than a primary one, since for increasing λ values the delay tends to dominate
in the total cost perceived by the user.
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium traffic sent by primary (λP ) and secondary users (λS) as a function of the total traffic, λ, accepted in the
network, for both the TOGETHER and BEFORE scenarios.
We now focus our analysis on operators’ utility, which we recall is defined as the product of the price
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set by the operator and the total flow transmitted by users that choose such operator. Figures 6(a) and 6(b)
show, respectively, the difference in utilities for the Primary (∆UP ) and Secondary operator (∆US) in
the TOGETHER and BEFORE scenarios.
It can be observed that it is increasingly more convenient for the PO to be a leader, anticipating the
SO, and this is reflected in the utility, which consistently grows for increasing λ values. At the same
time, for low and medium λ values (λ < 0.8C), even the SO obtains a higher utility in the BEFORE
scenario. This means that in such scenario, both operators achieve an economic advantage at the expense
of the total price paid by cognitive radio users.
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Fig. 6. (a) Difference in utilities UP of the Primary operator when he plays BEFORE and TOGETHER with the SO. (b)
Difference in utilities US of the secondary operator in the same scenarios.
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B. Effect of the channel capacity (C)
We now consider a variation of this network scenario, doubling the channel capacity C to 200; the
total traffic admitted in the primary network is illustrated in Figure 7. The trend is the same as already
shown in Figure 5(a), and a similar behavior can be observed for the secondary traffic, which is not
reported for the sake of brevity.
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Fig. 7. Equilibrium traffic sent by primary users (λP ) as a function of the total traffic, λ, accepted in the network, for both
the TOGETHER and BEFORE scenarios. The total channel capacity is C = 200.
On the other hand, Figure 8 shows the equilibrium traffic sent by primary users as a function of the
wireless channel capacity C , with λ fixed to 100. It can be observed that λP tends to λ2 (= 50 in this
case) in the BEFORE scenario, and to 2λ3 (≈ 66.6) in the TOGETHER scenario3. This behavior is in line
with what already observed in Figure 7, since when λ is consistently lower than C , the Primary operator
who plays before the SO (BEFORE scenario) tends to admit less traffic than this latter.
We further illustrate in Figure 9 the chosen price as well as the utility perceived by the Primary
operator, in both the considered scenarios, for increasing values of the channel capacity C and a total
accepted traffic λ fixed to 100 (note that the prices p1 set by the PO, illustrated in Figure 9(a), almost
overlap in the two considered scenarios). A similar trend can be observed for both the price and utility
of the Secondary operator (see Figure 10).
In summary, as the available capacity increases, operators fix increasingly lower prices, achieving a
lower total revenue.
3It suffices to compute the limit for C →∞ of λP in expression (6), substituting the equilibrium values p1, p2 for both the
considered scenarios. Note that such limit is independent of α.
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Fig. 8. Equilibrium traffic sent by primary users (λP ) as a function of the channel capacity C for both the TOGETHER and
BEFORE scenarios. The total traffic offered to the network, λ, is fixed and equal to 100.
The impact of C on the Price of Anarchy is further investigated in the following subsection VIII-C.
C. Efficiency of the reached equilibria: Price of Anarchy (PoA)
We now measure the efficiency of the equilibria reached by the system. The Price of Anarchy (PoA),
which in our game coincides with the Price of Stability due to the uniqueness of the equilibria reached by
operators and users, is illustrated in Figure 11 for both the TOGETHER (PoAT ) and BEFORE scenarios
(PoAB).
When both operators play together, the PoA is equal to 1 for both extreme cases (λ = 0 and λ = C).
Furthermore, it has a maximum equal to 1.0127 for λC =
2
3 , which means that, in such scenario, the
equilibrium reached by the system is only ≈ 1.3% worse (in terms of the overall experienced delay)
with respect to the socially optimal solution. In the BEFORE scenario, the PoA is also low, but the
trend exhibited by such performance figure differs from the previous scenario, since the PoA tends to
infinity for λ approaching the channel capacity C . This is due to the fact that the total cost for users at
equilibrium increases significantly faster than the social welfare, especially for high λ values.
As a consequence, such situation should be avoided by market controllers either 1) by controlling the
admitted traffic λ, imposing that it does not exceed a predefined fraction of the available channel capacity,
or 2) by preventing the BEFORE scenario to occur, imposing antitrust policies to limit dominant position
abuse.
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Fig. 9. (a) Primary operator’s price p1 and (b) utility UP as a function of the channel capacity C for both the TOGETHER
and BEFORE scenarios. The total traffic offered to the network, λ, is fixed and equal to 100. Note that prices p1 practically
overlap in the two considered scenarios.
Figure 12 further reports the PoA as a function of the channel capacity C for both the considered
scenarios; λ is fixed and equal to 100. It is not surprising that both curves decrease rapidly with C , since,
as already observed in Figure 11, when λ is consistently lower than C , the PoA→ 1 in both scenarios.
In summary, we can conclude that, apart from the limiting case illustrated before for very high traffic
loads, the quality of the reached equilibria is indeed excellent: when the system is loaded at less than
95%, which is a reasonable operating region, the PoA is always less than 1.1, which means a loss of
efficiency of 10% with respect to the social optimum. The system hence converges to a stable state which
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Fig. 10. (a) Secondary operator’s price p2 and (b) utility US as a function of the channel capacity C for both the TOGETHER
and BEFORE scenarios. The total traffic offered to the network, λ, is fixed and equal to 100.
is globally very efficient.
D. Replicator Dynamics for the Network Selection Game
We now analyze the convergence of the proposed replicator dynamics, fixing λ = 30 and C = 100.
Figure 13 illustrates such convergence (expressed in steps needed in the replicator dynamics) of network
users to a stationary solution, for different values of the parameter K in equation (24), namely 1, 5
and 10. More specifically, the figure reports the fraction XP of users that choose the primary network.
We consider both cases where the initial fraction of such users is close to zero (Figure 13(a)) and one
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Fig. 11. The Price of Anarchy as a function of the total traffic offered to the network, λ, in both the TOGETHER (PoAT )
and BEFORE (PoAB) scenarios.
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Fig. 12. The Price of Anarchy as a function of the channel capacity C for both the TOGETHER (PoAT ) and BEFORE
(PoAB) scenarios. The total traffic offered to the network, λ, is fixed and equal to 100.
(Figure 13(b)).
Note that the speed of convergence to the unique stable equilibrium point of the dynamics (X∗P ≈ 0.68,
in such scenario) increases for increasing K values. Furthermore, when p1 and p2 are equilibrium price
values, we observe that the convergence conditions demonstrated in Theorems 1 and 2 for our proposed
replicator dynamics (see the previous section) are always satisfied.
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Fig. 13. Convergence of Primary Users to the stationary point (X∗P ≈ 0.68). The initial point is (a) lower or (b) higher than
the equilibrium.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tackled a fundamental problem related to Cognitive Radio Networks, i.e., the joint
pricing and Primary/Secondary network selection process. More specifically, we considered a CRN
scenario which is composed of primary/secondary networks and a set of Cognitive Radio users who
must decide whether to subscribe to the primary network for guaranteed bandwidth or to access the
secondary network, paying a lower price at the expense of possible service degradation (in terms of
experienced delay and congestion). At the same time, we studied the pricing game between the Primary
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and Secondary operators, considering two practical cases where such operators fix their access price
simultaneously, and where the PO anticipates the SO strategy, exploiting his dominant position.
We computed optimal, stable pricing values and network selection settings; furthermore, we studied
network users’ dynamics using a population game model, and we determined its convergence properties
under replicator dynamics. Numerical results demonstrate that our game model captures the main factors
behind cognitive network pricing and access network selection, thus representing a promising framework
for the design and understanding of cognitive radio systems.
A key finding of the present study is that the advantage for the PO to play before the SO can be
significant, especially in a high traffic regime; this has an adverse impact on customers’ choices, since in
such situation the equilibria reached by cognitive radio users drift away from the social optimum, and the
Price of Anarchy tends to infinity. It is therefore important (e.g., for government, regulation authorities),
to implement actions that prevent or limit such dominant position abuse, if possible.
Apart from this limiting case, which occurs exclusively for very high traffic regimes, we observe that
the quality of the reached equilibria is excellent: when the system is loaded at less than 95%, which
seems a reasonable operating region, the PoA is always less than 1.1 (regardless of the order in which
operators fix their price), which means a loss of efficiency of 10% with respect to the social optimum.
Hence, the system is guaranteed to converge to a stable state which is very efficient from a social point
of view.
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